Unilever India in 2004: In search of a growth strategy

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Introduction

In mid-2004, Hindustan Lever Ltd (HLL), India's largest Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) company announced disappointing results. The company seemed to be struggling to grow its business. Just a few months back, HLL had announced a major top management reshuffle. According to many press reports, this restructuring which had taken place at the instance of parent company, Unilever, seemed to be a public admission of the challenges being faced by the company. The question uppermost in the minds of analysts was whether HLL could return to the heady days of the mid-1990s, when double digit growth had come so easily. Such doubts had caused stock market operators to hammer down HLL's stock price. On May 2, 2000 when M S Banga had taken over as HLL Chairman, the HLL share (face value = Rs. 10) was quoting at Rs. 2,190. In April 2004, the share (face value = Rs. 1) price was only Rs. 150.

Background Note

HLL, was a 51% subsidiary of the Anglo-Dutch conglomerate, Unilever, one of the largest FMCG companies in the world. Over the years, HLL had acquired a tremendous reputation as one of India's best-managed companies. Despite being the subsidiary of an MNC, HLL was perceived to be more Indian than foreign, in the way it managed its operations. HLL was believed to operate with considerably more autonomy than other subsidiaries in the Unilever system.

HLL's origin went back to 1885 when the Lever Brothers set up 'William Hesketh Lever', in England. In 1888, the company entered India by exporting 'Sunlight', its laundry soap. In 1930, the company merged with 'Margarine Unie' (a Netherlands based company which exported vanaspati to India), to form Unilever. In 1931, Unilever set up its first Indian subsidiary, the Hindustan Vanaspati Manufacturing Company for the production of vanaspati. This was followed by the establishment of Lever Brothers India Ltd. in 1933 and United Traders Ltd. in 1935, for the distribution of personal products. In November 1956, the three Indian subsidiaries merged to form HLL.

In the 1990s, HLL expanded its operations through mergers and acquisitions. In April 1993, the company acquired its largest competitor, Tata Oil Mills Company (TOMCO), the biggest such deal in Indian industry till that time. HLL formed a 50:50 joint venture with another Tata company, Lakme Ltd in 1995. The venture named 'Lakme Lever Ltd.' marketed Lakme's leading cosmetics and other associated products. Subsequently in 1998, Lakme sold its products to HLL and divested its 50% stake in the venture.

In January 1996, group company Brooke Bond Lipton India Ltd. (BBLIL) merged with HLL. Unilever had acquired Lipton in 1972, and Lipton Tea (India) Ltd. was incorporated in 1977. Brooke Bond had joined the Unilever fold in 1984 through an international acquisition. Brooke Bond and Lipton India merged in July 1993 to form BBLIL.

Another group company, Pond's India Ltd, merged with HLL in January 1998. Pond's India Ltd. had been present in India since 1947. It became an HLL group company when Unilever acquired Chesebrough Pond's USA in 1986. By the mid-1990s, the integration of the different Unilever entities operating in India, had been completed by and large.

Business Segments

HLL had five main divisions, Soaps & Detergents, Personal Products, Beverages, Foods and Ice creams (See Exhibit III). HLL also had a separate exports division. The company's exports included soaps and detergents, personal products, home care products, tea and coffee and other items such as marine products, basmati rice, castor oil and its derivatives. HLL was one of India's largest exporters. The Government of India had recognized HLL as a Golden Super Star Trading House[1].

The soaps business had famous brands such as Lifebuoy, Lux, Liril, Hamam, Pears, Breeze and Dove. The detergents business had brands like Surf Excel,

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[1] A company with above Rs. 6000 Crores of exports in a year according to Govt. of India, Ministry of Commerce & Industry.

Surf, Rin, Wheel (the number one detergent brand in India, and HLL's largest), 501, OK, Ala and Sunlight. HLL also offered the Vim and Domex range of Home Care Products.

The Personal Care Products business was divided into Hair Care, Oral Care, Skin Care, Color Cosmetics, Deodorants and Fragrances. The main Hair Care brands were Clinic, Sunsilk and Lux Shampoos and Nihar oil. Oral Care brands included Close-up and Pepsodent toothpastes and toothbrushes. In Skin Care, HLL marketed Fair & Lovely Skin Cream and Lotion. The Lotion, which was a brand developed in India and exported to over 30 countries, had been extended as an Ayurvedic cream, an under-eye cream, soap and talc. The other major Skin Care franchises were Pond's, Vaseline, Lakme and Pears. In Color Cosmetics, HLL marketed the Lakme and Elle-18 ranges. In Deodorants, the key brands were Rexona, Axe, Denim and Pond's. The major Talc brands were Pond's, Liril, Fair & Lovely, Vaseline and Lifebuoy. HLL's men's toiletries included Axe and Denim.

Health Care was among the new businesses HLL had chosen to enter. The Ayush range of Ayurvedic Health & Personal Care Products, launched in 2002, included Cough Naashak Syrup, Headache Naashak Roll-on, Dandruff Naashak Shampoo, Hair Rakshak Oil and Body Rakshak Soap. The brand seal was 'Truth of Ayurveda; Proof of Science'.

HLL was one of the world's largest packet tea marketers, owning leading tea brands like Taj Mahal, Red Label, Taaza, A1 and Three Roses. The coffee business consisted of Bru Instant Coffee and Deluxe Green Label Roast & Ground Coffee.

The Kissan and Knorr Foods range comprised Spreads & Jams, Biscuit Sticks, Soups, Squashes, Tomato Ketchup, Sauces, Puree, and Cooking Aids. HLL also marketed popular food items like wheat flour and iodized edible salt, under the Knorr Annapurna brand name. The range had been expanded recently with ready-to-eat 10-second chapattis (Indian bread).

HLL had invested heavily in the foods business, believing innovative offerings could prompt consumers to shift towards processed, hygienic, healthy and convenient products. But the business had not performed as well as the company had expected. Between 1998 and 2002, the revenues from the foods business had shrunk, from Rs 932 crore to Rs 715 crore, when oils and fats, processed fruits and vegetables and branded staples were included. If beverages (mainly packed tea and coffee) were included, between 1998 and 2002, the foods and beverages turnover would have dropped by a dramatic 29 per cent, from Rs 2,731 crore to Rs 1,947 crore. The contribution of the foods business to HLL's total revenues decreased from 10% in 1998 to 7% in 2002 while that of beverages reduced from 19% in 1998 to 12% by 2002.

The Kwality-Wall's Ice Cream range comprised exotic Sundaes, Viennetta Desserts, popular 'Impulse' segment products like Max, Cornetto and Feast, and Cornetto Ripple Softies. Max was extended in 2001 as sugar confectionery, one of the new businesses HLL had chosen to enter.

In 2002, HLL's growth was driven by strong performance in Personal wash (11.3%), Fabric wash (8%), Dish wash (19.4%) and Skin care (21.8%). In Foods (including Ice Cream) where HLL had laid heavy bets, sales declined by 11.6%.

Project Millennium

For HLL, the problem of slow growth had not appeared overnight. Aware of the fact that many of the growth opportunities had been tapped, Chairman Keki Dadiseth launched Project Millennium in the late 1990s. The famous management guru, C K Prahalad, was roped in as an advisor. Teams of young, talented managers were formed to explore and suggest ways to generate growth. Project millennium also aimed at promoting lateral thinking and innovation instead of being dictated only by the rules and systems, HLL was famous for. At the heart of Project Millennium was human resources.

As Dadiseth[2] put it,

> *"Growth is created by the people of an organization. To win in the New Millennium, we must continue to attract and excite the best talent in the country. Our people will be vested with unparalled*

[2] *Business Today*, 7th August 1999.

power to imagine, innovate and implement new ideas. Our business model will make Levers not just a great company, but also a great employer."

HLL realized that to exploit business opportunities effectively, the traditional way of functioning had to change.

Dadiseth's successor, M S Banga[3] believed that speed was important to excite and motivate younger managers:

"In the past, we often tended to act after a lot of thought and a lot of research. That is fine. But we must also recognize that we have a lot of individual talent. More important we have a lot of collective talent. I believe that one way to enhance speed of action is to rely much more on the individual and collective instinct."

In 1999, around the time Banga took charge, signs of slower growth were evident. In personal products which accounted for 17.4 percent of HLL's turnover, the growth rate declined to 16 percent from 30. Soaps, detergents and scourers, which formed 40 percent of the turnover, grew by less than 11 percent. In ice creams, where the company had a 50% market share, growth was a mere 10%. In beverages, sales dropped by 12%. Overall, HLL's sales grew by about 7%, a rate that was disappointing when compared with the heady days of the early and mid-1990s.

In categories like soaps and detergents, HLL discovered that consumers were shifting from premium, high-value products to lower priced brands. Meanwhile, in businesses like personal wash, where HLL had nearly 70% market share, penetration levels had reached 90%, leaving few growth opportunities.

Despite the circumstances under which he had taken charge, Banga remained optimistic. He believed growth lay more in the mindset than anything else. [4]

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[3] *Business Today*, 7th June 2000 – 21st June 2000.

[4] *Business Today*, 7th June 2000 – 21st June 2000.

"If instead of the toilet-soap market, you look at the market for bathing, you are talking about an opportunity that is several times bigger."

HLL executives also believed that there were exciting opportunities to enter various service businesses (such as laundry) that had strong links with existing businesses. While addressing the shareholders at the 2000 Annual General Meeting, Dadiseth also indicated that the company was well positioned to leverage the Internet to create "India's most widespread, robust and efficient clicks-and-bricks company". Another initiative launched by HLL was to grow new businesses such as foods. It had always been a challenge to persuade Indian customers to graduate from commodities to brands in the foods business.

Gunender Kapoor, Executive Director (Foods) and HLL's youngest board member explained how the company was meeting the challenge[5],

"Strategically, we are looking at three things: relevant superior benefits to the customers; leveraging our technology to add value to commodities and using our supply-chain expertise to keep costs and therefore, prices affordable."

Within foods, one business, which showed tremendous promise, was salts.

Banga explained how HLL had changed the paradigm in the salts business[6]:

"Salt is as much a commodity as you can think of. When we entered the salt business, we faced a huge challenge on how to brand it. But as we worked on it, we realized that there was a huge opportunity to deliver real value to the consumer. This real value was by delivering iodine. It is extremely important for children in their formative years to have a regular dose of iodine in small, measured quantities… Clinical studies have proven that there is a huge difference between the IQ levels of children who get the right level of iodine and those who don't. We linked all these facts and involved our technical

[5] *Business Today*, 7th June 2000 – 21st June 2000.
[6] *Business Today*, 7th June 2000 – 21st June 2000.

> *people to produce a superior product. We also looked at the supply chain and worked on innovative ideas to make sure we were the lowest cost producer of salt. Today, we have a salt business that is growing very fast."*

As the Project Millennium teams sat across the country to talk to people and generate new ideas, there were press reports that the ideas of the past were being systematically challenged. Working with McKinsey, the consulting firm, HLL also divided its businesses into three categories. Horizon 1 referred to the mature businesses. Horizon 2 consisted of businesses with rich growth possibilities where the company had already made a start – popular foods, deodorants, ice-creams. Horizon 3 consisted of areas that were smaller or where no markets existed at the moment, but might explode soon. One example was the direct-selling format created for the Aviance brand of cosmetics.

As an extension of Project Millennium, Banga decided to concentrate HLL's resources on brands with maximum potential, size, competitive strength and growth potential. These brands came to be known as power brands. Non power brands which were of significant size and had the core proposition of a power brand were migrated into power brands. It was decided to milch brands with no future (like flavours and fragrances) and phase them out.

In late 2001, the power-branding strategy seemed to be showing promise. While it was too early to predict whether the strategy would succeed in the long run, Banga remained confident[7],

> *"We're on the right track, if you look at the growth of our power brands against the backdrop of the growth in the categories in which they operate. All our brand health indicators are getting stronger."*

HLL indicated it would continue to focus on 30-40 brands and put more people behind these brands.

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[7] *Business Today*, 15th November 2001.

As Project Millennium took off, HLL executives expressed satisfaction at the way people at all levels were getting involved. Several small experiments were launched across the company. One such initiative involved the use of hand-held computers by sales people in the personal products division for order-processing. Another involved web marketing.

Exhibit: I
Financial performance at a glance

	1999	1998	1997	1996	CAGR (%)
Revenue	10,461	9,727	8,003	6,718	16
Net Profit	1,070	806	560	414	37
EPS – Rs	49	40	28	28	20
RONW (%)	51	47	44	42	

Source: Business India, 6th March 2000 – 19th March 2000.

Project Millennium helped HLL identify eight new forays. But out of these, only confectionery, had taken off by late 2001.

Banga explained[8],

> *"We can move at lightening speed only in those businesses that we understand. In the new areas, plenty of care and caution have to be exercised, since we have to develop new competencies".*

HLL's philosophy was that if a new project had to take off, it had to find a 'resting place' in one of the existing businesses. Among the various new ideas HLL was exploring in late 2001 was Project Shakti, a micro-finance project which involved distribution of products through self-help-groups in Andhra Pradesh.

As parent Unilever watched the action at its Indian subsidiary with great interest, there were reports that HLL had introduced new benchmarks in the process of formulating and implementing strategy.

One report mentioned[9],

[8] *Business Today*, 15th November 2001.
[9] *Business Today*, 7th August 1999.

"Project Millennium would even demolish the assumption that a company has to accept trade-offs when it makes strategic choices. For, its very mandate is to make Levers not an either or (either profits or growth, either focused or diversified, either systems-driven or entrepreneurial, either centralized or decentralized) corporation. It is, instead to make it the And Corporation, which can reconcile the contractions between strategic choices. As Michael Porter might have said, Project Millennium may set a template for strategy innovation."

Human Resources

HLL's top management realized that its ability to attract and nurture good talent would be crucial to the success of Project Millennium. Over the years, HLL's leadership development model, considered one of the best in the country, had groomed managers by providing a well-rounded view of the business through job rotation and various new assignments. The system was designed to identify fast-trackers, who were called the Lever listers and groom them for handling greater responsibilities. For every position, typically three people competed. One would eventually make it, the second person would be offered an alternative slot, while the third would simply fall out of the system.

This leadership development model served HLL well for many years. The company effectively became a school for practising managers. But in the late 1990s, as the business environment underwent a sea change, cracks began to appear in the model. First, there was a reduction in the number of positions due to the withdrawal of many brands under HLL's power branding strategy. The closure of non-core businesses, like seeds and the downsizing of the large commercial department, due to outsourcing of a large number of backroom activities, also eliminated many promotional opportunities.

Meanwhile, Unilever itself began to divest brands and businesses, reducing the need for expensive expatriate talent. As a matter of fact, the supply of HLL's pipeline of talent grew because of returning expatriates from the Unilever system.

With fewer slots available and supply increasing, internal competition also increased. During good times, most managers got good performance ratings. But the system changed as growth slowed down and competition increased. In the early 2000s, HLL instituted a forced rank system of evaluating people for all its businesses, further accentuating the insecurities inside the minds of employees. Managers began to rely on short-term recourses to deliver quarterly profit and sales numbers. If one brand team did well to grow through a short-term scheme, there was immediate pressure on the others to follow the same.

The process of identifying fast trackers began to cause disgruntlement among employees. Initially, when HLL instituted the system of listers, it had focused more on performance. However, over the years, apart from performance, the potential of the person had played a bigger role in identifying the fast trackers. This seemed to have introduced an element of subjectivity in the process of identifying talent.

When Dadiseth rolled out Project Millennium, many young managers were identified to lead a set of new growth initiatives. But these initiatives had moved Lever into entirely new areas, which took a long time to be conceptualized and implemented. Under the Lever system, there were clear work levels, which defined the nature of work and responsibilities. So, unless there was a change in the nature of work, a manager could not be promoted to the next level.

Career progression was also slowing down at senior levels. Many of the management committee members, like the head of the foods division, Gunender Kapur had been expected to move to larger regional roles in Asia. But the continued non-performance of the foods business had thrown a spanner in the works. That meant that category heads were unlikely to find a berth soon, until someone at the top moved on. Many HLL managers had CEO aspirations. They were attracted by the opportunities opening up in the country in newly liberalized businesses like telecom, healthcare and insurance. They moved when they felt they did not get any clear signals from the top management about what the future held for them.

In 2002, responding to these concerns, HLL switched to an open job posting (OJP) system. All new jobs were advertised on the intranet. Any employee who met the criteria could apply. HLL also started a new personal development plan (PDP), where each manager was evaluated on a set of 12 competencies. The superior was expected to discuss the assessment with each person.

An update on Project Millennium

In the early 2000s, HLL extended the reach of its products through a new channel, the HLL Network to leverage the power of direct selling. The HLL Network was poised to enter various categories. HLL enrolled over 1, 00,000 consultants for the Network. The company targeted a turnover of Rs. 500 crores and planned to have a million consultants working for it by 2007.

In addition, HLL proposed a revamp of its entire brand portfolio in the face of severe competition from low-cost manufacturers and other multinational players. HLL planned to upgrade its soap, skin cream, shampoo and toothpaste products, and launch new variants. Among the major initiatives was a new variant of Fair & Lovely, to pre-empt Procter & Gamble's (P&G) proposed launch of 'Oil of Olay' in India, a relaunch of Clinic Plus shampoo and Close Up toothpaste and a new Liril Orange Splash soap, in addition to Liril Lime Fresh and Liril Icy Cool Mint.[10]

Besides revamping its brand portfolio, HLL realized that the bulk of its future growth was likely to come from rural areas. The company embarked upon Project Shakti, which enlisted underprivileged rural women as direct-to-home distributors. Not only did this initiative provide sustainable income opportunities, but it also extended HLL's rural reach to another 100 million consumers in over 100,000 villages.

But despite all these initiatives, HLL found growth increasingly hard to come by. Between 1993 and 1999, HLL's sales had surged five-fold to Rs 10,142 crore. But since 2000, they had stagnated at about Rs 10,000 crore.

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[10] "HLL ups the ante, plans to revamp brand portfolio," *www.economictimes.indiatimes.com,* 8th April 2004.

In most of its businesses, HLL faced severe concerns. In soaps & detergents, competition at the lower end with local players and at the top end with Procter & Gamble had taken its toll.

In ice creams, both Amul and HLL were running almost neck-to-neck. But because of Amul's low-priced offerings, HLL’s share had drastically come down. HLL had decided to abandon the mass market and chase the premium business, concentrating on just seven major cities. By 2004, Amul was the market leader with a 27 per cent share followed by Kwality-Wall's at 8 per cent[11].

In the beverages business, stiff competition came from both loose and packaged tea players including a rejuvenated Tata Tea. From 109,000 tonnes in 2001, HLL brewed only 80,674 tonnes of packet tea, with market share dipping from 34.6 per cent in 2002 to 33 percent in 2004.

The foods business had not only struggled to grow but had also been a drag on HLL's profitability. Indeed, the business had turned out to be a different cup of tea. In case of soaps, detergents and toothpastes, the market was dominated by just one or two large national brands. Finished product prices had little correlation to the prices of inputs. The foods business was not only fragmented, but finished product prices appeared to be strongly correlated with the underlying commodity prices. Despite its deep pockets, HLL had not managed to grow the foods business as expected.

HLL realized that most of its markets were getting saturated and the only way to grow was by eating into the market share of competitors. HLL had introduced a fresh round of price cuts in some of its key categories such as detergents, oral care and hair care in early 2004. But this put more pressure on its bottom line.

Meanwhile, the ebusiness initiatives launched during the halcyon days of the Web had not yielded the expected results. As B2B and B2C transactions failed to gain traction, HLL had to retreat on its plans to leverage the Internet in a major way.

[11] ibid.

Changes At The Top

> *"First we streamlined and simplified our brands and business, now we are simplifying our management structure to empower decision-making and give the managing directors powers to ensure that out speed of execution can be faster."*
>
> \- Banga[12]

In what appeared to be a public admission of the challenges facing the company, HLL announced sweeping changes in its management structure on April 15, 2004.

- All FMCG businesses would be consolidated into two divisions, Home & Personal Care (HPC) and Foods.

- HPC would include soaps & detergents and personal products, Foods would include beverages, foods, and ice cream and confectionary businesses.

- With effect from 1st July 2004, Banga would become the Business Group President of Unilever's $6 billion HPC business in Asia. He would remain non-executive Chairman.
- A four-member national management team headed by M. K. Sharma, Vice-Chairman of the company would be established.

- New ventures and non-FMCG businesses such as plantations, specialty exports would be headed by executive directors.

A senior HLL executive commented[13]

> *"The new structure will simplify the organization and speed up the decision-making process. We will be able to sharply focus on brands and categories. Besides, it will reduce overhead costs and the money from this will be invested in brands."*

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[12] *The Economic Times*, 16th April 2004.
[13] *Business Standard*, 16th April 2004.

Earlier, HLL had 12 directors (including executive directors) heading different businesses, who reported to chairman Banga. After the restructuring, soaps and detergents were integrated into HPC. HLL was effectively split into two businesses -- HPC and Foods -- each under a new managing director. This structure largely resembled that of parent, Unilever.

Arun Adhikari, executive director of personal care, was re-designated managing director of the integrated HPC business. S Ravindranath, executive director, beverages, began to oversee the integrated foods business, which included ice cream, processed foods and confectionery. Reporting to Banga was the four-member management committee comprising vice-chairman M K Sharma, finance director D Sundaram and the HPC and foods heads. All the remaining directors reported to Sharma.

For long HLL had been a benchmark for many of Unilever's less-successful outposts in Southeast Asia and Latin America. Whether it was product development or its marketing strategies or its array of profit centers, HLL was always considered worthy of emulation. By and large, Unilever had let the Indian subsidiary operate with plenty of autonomy. But these recent developments seemed to mark a turning point in HLL's tradition of enjoying full autonomy.

One management consultant commented[14]

> *"In Unilever's internal hierarchy, India seems to have lost out. It is no longer a shining star,"*

The Road Ahead

In mid-2004, the challenges which HLL faced in restoring growth, looked formidable. Penetration levels in most FMCG categories had become saturated. Another trend affecting FMCG sales of the increase in spending on consumer durables, education, health care and travel.

According to one analyst[15],

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[14] *Business Standard,* 16th April 2004.

> *"Consumers want things that offer real improvement in lifestyle, not just costlier soap. They want fancier mobile phones, better cars, higher education for their children – and now they can afford these things. They would rather spend on these things than increase their consumption of FMCG products – or for that matter, buy pricier FMCG products."*

Many analysts were expecting cheaper regional brands to offer stiff competition to HLL. As organized retailing grew in India, there were also concerns that private labels and store brands would also increase in importance.

Amidst these developments in the environment, HLL's Power Branding strategy had also come under attack. Some analysts felt than in the process of rationalizing and restructuring the brand portfolio, smaller brands that could be potential winners in the long run, had been thrown down the drain. But Banga believed that this view was not correct.[16]

> *"Power brands were selected for current size and future potential. We have brands which are currently very big and have potential for growth and also brands that are currently very small but have large growth potential. Lakme is today substantially smaller than Lux but both are power brands. Axe is substantially smaller than Lakme, but it is again a power brand."*

What could HLL do to get back to the double digit growth path of the 1990s? This was the question which taxed the minds of HLL's top management as they adjusted to the new management structure announced in April, 2004.

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[15] *Business India*, 26th April 2004 – 9th May 2004.
[16] *Business India*, 26th April 2004 – 9th May 2004.

Exhibit: II
HLL – Strengths/Weaknesses

Strengths :

- Strong and well differentiated brands with leading share positions. Brand portfolio includes both global Unilever brands and local brands of specific relevance to India.
- Consumer understanding and systems for building consumer insight.
- Strong R&D capability, well linked with business.
- Integrated supply chain and well spread manufacturing units.
- Distribution structure with wide reach, high quality coverage and ability to leverage scale.
- Access to Unilever global technology capability and sharing of best practices from other Unilever companies.
- High quality manpower resources.

Weaknesses :

- Increased consumer spends on education, consumer durable, entertainment, travel etc. resulting in lower share of wallet for FMCG.
- Limited success in changing eating habits of people.
- Complex supply chain configuration, unwieldy number. of SKU's with dispersed manufacturing locations.
- Price positioning in some categories allows for low price competition.
- High Social costs (housing, foodgrains & firewood, health and other welfare measures) in the plantation business.

Source: HLL, Annual Report 2002.

Exhibit: III

HLL – Product Portfolio

Soaps & Detergents Personal Wash Fabric Wash Household Care **Personal Products** Oral Care Skin Care Hair Care Deodorants & Talcs Colour Cosmetics Health Care **Beverages** Tea and Coffee	**Foods** Popular Foods Culinary Products Modern Foods ranges **Ice Creams** **New Ventures** Confectioneries HLL Network Project Shakti

Source: www.hll.com

Exhibit: IV

HLL – Product Profile[17]

Personal Care	**Brands**
Skin Care	Fair & Lovely, Pond's
Oral Care	Pepsodent, Close Up
Hair Care	Sunsilk, Clinic
Deodorants	Axe, Rexona, Pond's
Colour cosmetics	Lakme
Household Products	
Fabric Wash	Surf, Rin, Wheel
Personal Wash	Lifebuoy, Liril, Lux, Breeze
Household Care	Vim, Domex
Foods & Beverages	**Brands**
Ice creams	Kwality Wall's
Beverages	Brooke Bond (Taj Mahal, Red Label, 3 Roses, Taaza), Lipton (Yellow Label, Green Label, Ice tea).
Popular Foods	Knorr Annapurna atta & salt, Modern Foods range
Culinary	Kissan

Source: www.hll.com

[17] The product listing is not exhaustive. HLL owns around 110 brands and the list gives only the important brands which HLL calls 'power brands'.

Exhibit: V
The Economic Times – Brand Equity
Ranking of India's biggest FMCG brands, 2003

Brand	**Sales (Rs. Crores)**	**Rank in 2003**	**Rank in 2002**
Wheel	826.2	11	10
Brooke Bond	819.0	12	-
Lux	760.1	13	11
Lifebuoy	733.0	14	13
Fair & Lovely	639.6	18	21
Rin	623.8	19	12
Pond's	412.6	28	25
Surf	396.4	29	27
Clinic	387.2	33	24
Pepsodent	380.5	34	22
Breeze	312.5	40	28
Close-Up	296.4	42	31
Vim	257.6	48	53
Rexona	193.6	64	45
Annapurna	175.2	70	50
Hamam	161.9	73	65
Sunsilk	153.6	75	58
Pears	125.0	88	94
Kissan	120.1	93	83

Source: "The Gods of Big Things," The Economic Times – Brand Equity, 21st April 2004.

Exhibit: VI
Business Leadership Program in Sales & Marketing

Activity	Description
Familiarization	Get familiar with the company's Sales System, Branch Structure and Brand Portfolio.
Sales Stint	Experience a first hand contact with the trade to get a grip of market dynamics and understand the role of an Area Sales Manager.
Brand Management	Imbibe the Unilever principles of Brand Management, understand the role of a Brand Manager and develop brand strategy.
International Stint	Complete a project in your core functional area in another country within a duration of 8 to 12 weeks. The objective is to help you build relevant skills in your core functional area with a global perspective and transfer your learning’s to an Indian context.
Business Projects	A cross-functional team project which shall be worked out with every Business Management Committee and evaluated by the Management Committee at the end of the stipulated 9 week period.
Rural Consumer Stint	In addition to the primary aim of community service, the objective of the four-week stint at an NGO is to give you an understanding of the Rural Consumer.
Business Orientation Program	An 11-day program that mainly consists of classroom sessions at our in-house Training Centers to provide a clearer understanding of key business processes and practices.
Factory Stint	Get familiar with the production process, commercial function payments and factory working capital control.

Source: HLL Careers, www.hll.com

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